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Introduction 
When asked to contribute to this special edition of the Essex Human Rights Review, to 
celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Human Rights Centre, I thought it important to 
look at the significance of the Inter-American System of Human Rights (IASHR) on 
States Members of the Organisation of American States (OAS), in one of those areas 
where the system is recognised for its special contribution to the development of 
international human rights law: gross human rights violations. This year is the 20th 
anniversary of the groundbreaking decision on the merits of the Velásquez Rodriguez case.1 
For that reason it is worth taking this opportunity to look back at some of the 
achievements in the fight against impunity for gross human rights violations. 
As the role played by the IASHR in the fight against impunity has been uneven 
across the Americas,2 I will concentrate on the specific role of the Inter-American Court 
(IACtHR or Court) in Peru, and in particular on the role it played in bringing Alberto 
Fujimori to justice. Fujimori is the first former head of state to have been extradited to 
his home country to face justice for, among others, two cases of gross human rights 
violations: Barrios Altos and La Cantuta.3 
During the period 1980-2000 Peru was ruled by three presidents: Fernando 
Belaunde (1980-1985), Alan Garcia (1985-1990, and current president of Peru), and 
                                                 
* I would like to thank the persons present at the LSE seminar on Fujimori and Human Rights Law, 29 
Apr. 2008, for their questions and views on this topic. Special thanks to Professor John Crabtree from 
Oxford University for his important insights on the political context of Peru and to Michael Duttwiler for 
his views and opinions. 
Clara Sandoval is a Lecturer in the Law Department at Essex University, Co-Director of the LLM in 
International Human Rights Law and member of the Human Rights Centre. She teaches and researches on 
areas related to the Inter-American System of Human Rights, Public International Law, Legal Theory, 
Business and Human Rights and Transitional Justice. Her more recent scholarship has been focused on 
reparations for gross human rights violations. As part of such research, she advised the International 
Criminal Court on the award of reparations for gross human rights violations by regional human rights 
courts, and was part of the research carried out by the ICTJ on reparations for the next of kin of victims of 
gross human rights violations under international law. Besides her academic commitments, Clara also 
engages in human rights litigation, training and capacity building with organisations such as the IBA and 
REDRESS. In 2007 she was a member of the IBA-FCO mission to Colombia, that assessed the 
implementation of the Justice and Peace Law/demobilisation and prosecution process in the country, and 
the role played by international cooperation in the process. 
1 The case concerns the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez Rodriguez in Honduras as part of a 
systematic practice carried out by the State. IACtHR, Velásquez Rodriguez, judgment on the merits, 29 Jul. 
1988.  
2 Certainly, the IASHR has not had the impact expected in countries like El Salvador and Uruguay, both of 
which enacted amnesty laws to avoid investigation, prosecution and punishment of those involved in the 
perpetration of gross human rights violations. See, B. Cuéllar, ‘El Salvador’ in Due Process of Law 
Foundation (ed.), Victims Unsilenced: The Inter-American Human Rights System and Transitional Justice in Latin 
America, (Washington: Due Process of Law Foundation, 2007) 33-70. 
3 IACtHR, Barrios Altos, judgment on the merits, 14 Mar. 2001; La Cantuta, judgment on the merits, 29 
Nov. 2006. 
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Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). Although democratically elected, all three adopted 
authoritarian policies to fight Peru’s internal armed conflict and to defeat two guerrilla 
groups, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac 
Amaru (MRTA). These bloody confrontations resulted in the deaths of approximately 
69,280 persons, and also left behind innumerable surviving victims.4 
Hopes for an end to Fujimori’s authoritarianism were raised some months after 
his second re-election as President in 2000, when he and Vladimiro Montesinos were 
implicated in a serious corruption scandal. Montesinos was Fujimori’s closest security 
adviser and de facto chief of the National Intelligence Service (SIN). Fujimori fled to Japan 
as his arrest was imminent. From Japan he faxed his resignation to congress and applied 
for Japanese citizenship to avoid extradition. The Peruvian congress declared him 
morally unfit for office. This scandal put an end to a decade of Fujimori’s political power 
in Peru. 
The interim President of Peru, Valentín Paniagua, and the newly democratically 
elected one, Alejandro Toledo, set the foundations for transitional justice in Peru. Those 
foundations included the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC); the prosecution of Montesinos, other members of the military and Fujimori for 
corruption related crimes and for serious human rights violations; and the re-trial of 
those who had been unfairly detained and condemned for the crime of terrorism or 
treason to the fatherland. Equally, Peru was committed to improving its relationship with 
the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACommHR, the Commission) and, more importantly, the IACtHR. In July 
1999, due to several decisions taken by the IACtHR against Peru and its fight against 
terrorism, and some important ones that were pending - such as Barrios Altos - Peru had 
adopted a resolution authorising its unilateral withdrawal from the contentious 
jurisdiction of the Court.5 Thus one of the first things to be addressed during the 
transition was the re-establishment of the relationship between Peru and the OAS. 
In Peru, as in any process of transitional justice, a variety of persons and 
institutions have played a role in seeking and achieving justice, peace, truth, reconciliation 
and reparations for past crimes. Among them, it is possible to distinguish between those 
that play a primary role as ‘protagonists’, such as the TRC, the Prosecutors Office or the 
Government of Peru, and those who, not being part of the day-to-day processes, 
complement the work carried out by those bodies/institutions and/or are able to 
produce lasting consequences for people working on the ground. These latter actors can 
be called ‘participants’. This article is about the IACtHR, one of the participants in the 
process of transitional justice in Peru, and the significance of its judgments in Barrios 
Altos and La Cantuta to the fight against impunity in that country.  
The article begins with a brief introduction to Fujimori’s government, followed 
by an analysis of the role played by the IASHR, both Commission and Court, but 
primarily by the latter. This section also analyses the cases of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta 
and their relationship to the extradition of Fujimori and his prosecution in Peru. The 
article concludes with some remarks in relation to the decisive role that institutions such 
as the IACtHR, which are not acknowledged as protagonists of processes of transitional 
justice, can have in establishing their limits and possibilities and, more importantly, in 
seizing political opportunities to help in their development. 
 
                                                 
4 Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 28 Aug. 2003, vol. 1, chap. 1, at 1. 
5 IACommHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, 2 Jun. 2000, chapter III.c, available at: 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Peru2000en/TOC.htm 
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1. President Fujimori and the Human Rights Situation in Peru 
At the time of Fujimori’s presidency Peru had ratified several United Nations and OAS 
human rights treaties, accepting as a consequence a variety of international obligations. 
Peru ratified, for instance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) on 28 April 1978, the Convention against Torture (CAT) on 7 July 1988, the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) on 28 July 1978 and the American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (ACPPT) on 27 February 1990.  
During the first few years of Fujimori’s government, the 1979 Constitution was 
in force. That Constitution established, in Clause 16 of Title VII, that the ICCPR, the 
ACHR and the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR were part of the Constitution of 
Peru,6 and Article 80 of that Constitution also established the duty of the state to 
guarantee the full enjoyment of human rights.7 After Fujimori’s coup d’état in 1992, the 
1993 Constitution was enacted. This constitution did not accord human rights the same 
status they had enjoyed under the 1979 Constitution, as it did not consider them part of 
the constitution. Nevertheless, it established that all articles of the Constitution relating 
to rights and liberties should be interpreted according to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the human rights treaties ratified by Peru.8  
Despite the existence of this protective human rights legal framework, serious 
human rights violations began to take place in Peru well before Alberto Fujimori was 
elected President in 1990, and continued while he was in power. On arrival in office he 
reinforced the policies implemented to fight the armed conflict of his predecessors,9 and 
to gain full political control in Peru he closed the Congress on 5 April 1992, reorganized 
the judiciary and called for reform of the 1979 Constitution. Fujimori transformed the 
National Security System, increased the power of the SIN over the military forces, and 
facilitated the dirty work of death squads such as the famous Colina group.10 
  Fujimori enacted several decrees establishing a draconian system of law. For 
instance, the crime of terrorism was modified in several aspects: the minimum age of 
prosecution was reduced from 18 to 15 years old, it was to be punished with life 
imprisonment, it was to be prosecuted by faceless military tribunals,11 and the length of 
criminal proceedings was severely reduced, thereby affecting the right to defence of the 
prosecuted person. Further, the independence and impartiality of judges was severely 
compromised. During the coup Fujimori removed the majority of Supreme Court judges, 
all of the judges of the Constitutional Court, the Public Prosecutor, and 134 other judges. 
Their replacements were appointed by the executive.12 By the end of the 1990s almost 80 
per cent of the judges in the country were provisional judges, meaning that they did not 
have security of tenure and could be removed from their jobs at any time.13  
Repressive measures were reflected not only by the coup d’état and the newly 
established legal framework but, more importantly, by the gross and systematic human 
rights violations (such as arbitrary killings, disappearances, torture and massacres) that 
 
6 Constitution of Peru (1979) http://www.congreso.gob.pe/comisiones/1999/simplificacion/const/ 
1979.htm 
7 Ibid. 
8 Constitution of Peru (1993), 4 final clause, http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/RelatAgenda 
/constitucion.nsf/constitucion?OpenView&Start=1&Count=30&Expand=7#7 
9 E. González, ‘The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Challenge of Impunity’ in N. 
Roht-Arriaza and J. Mariezcurrena (eds.), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus 
Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 70-93 at 72.  
10 TRC, n. 4 above,vol. III, chap. 2.3.  
11 TRC, ibid., 2.3.6.2. 
12 IACommHR, Second Report, n. 5 above, chap. II, para. 11. 
13 Ibid. 
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took place in Peru between 1989 and 1992, according to the IACtHR and the TRC.14 
Indeed, some of the bloodiest cases brought before the IACtHR against Peru, such as La 
Cantuta,15 Barrios Altos16 and Castro Castro Prison,17 occurred during this period.18 After 
1993, and due to international pressure, Peru was forced to change its human rights 
policy. The number of disappearances was reduced but new violations began to take 
place, including arbitrary detention, inhuman treatment and lack of due process of law.19 
 The Shining Path and the MRTA were equally authoritarian and cruel. According 
to the Peruvian TRC, the Shining Path is to be blamed for 53.68 per cent of the 
disappearances and arbitrary killings reported to it.20 Such violence was felt in rural areas 
and in the main cities. Indeed, between 1989 and 1992, 907 attacks and threats took place 
in Lima, amounting to 47 per cent of the total attacks and threats that were reported in 
the country during that period.21 Fear that the Shining Path could seize power 
encouraged people to support Fujimori. Nevertheless, between June and September 
1992, the two key leaders of the MRTA and the Shining Path, Victor Polay Campo and 
Abimael Guzmán respectively, were captured by the police. Their detentions marked the 
beginning of the end of these subversive movements. Yet, during the years to come, 
Fujimori maintained the idea that terrorism was being spread around the country.22 
1.1 Amnesty Laws and Impunity 
In 1995, five members of the army were accused of the massacre of Barrios Altos, which 
took place on 3 November 1991.23 One of the accused was Julio Salazar Monroe, 
Director of the SIN at the time of the events. The Prosecutor compelled the five accused 
persons to appear before the Court. They refused. So the Prosecutor filed charges against 
them before the Sixteenth Criminal Court of Lima. However, before ordinary criminal 
justice was able to proceed further, the military claimed jurisdiction over the case and 
asked the Supreme Court of Justice to adjudicate in the matter. Before that Court was 
able to make a decision as to which Court had jurisdiction, President Fujimori enacted 
Amnesty Law 26479, which exonerated from criminal responsibility any member of the 
military, the police, or a civilian who had taken part in a human rights violation between 
1980 and 1995. This law entered into force on 15 June 1995, allowing convictions to be 
annulled and processes stopped.24  
The Judge of the Sixteenth Criminal Court of Lima declared the amnesty law in 
violation of the Constitution. Therefore, Fujimori enacted Amnesty Law 26492, 
establishing that the amnesty law could not be revised by any judge and that its 
implementation was compulsory. This latter law also extended the amnesty, stating that 
any person who fell into one of the categories established in Amnesty Law 26479 could 
not be prosecuted for human rights violations.25 As a consequence, the proceedings in 
Barrios Altos and other cases were halted. After 1995, human rights violations and 
impunity continued. The military played a fundamental role in helping to avoid the 
prosecution of those said to be involved in serious human rights violations. It claimed 
                                                 
14 TRC, n. 4 above, vol. VI, chap. 1, and IACtHR, La Cantuta v. Peru, n. 3 above, para. 80.1 and 80.2. 
15 La Cantuta v. Peru, ibid. 
16 IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, n. 3 above. 
17 IACtHR, Castro Castro Prison, judgment on the merits and reparations, 25 Nov. 2006. 
18 See Appendix I for more information about cases decided by the IACtHR and their facts. 
19 TRC, n. 4 above, vol III, chap. 2.3.6.2,. 
20 TRC, n. 4 above, vol I, at 54. 
21 Ibid., vol III, at 2.3.7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, n. 3 above, at 2.g. 
24 Ibid., para. 2i-2k. 
25 Ibid., para. 2g-2n. 
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jurisdiction over many cases and most of the times considered that there was not 
sufficient evidence to incriminate persons in the crimes imputed.26 On other occasions 
no investigations were conducted until after the fall of President Fujimori.27 
 
2. The Role of the IASHR 
The IASHR has used its multifaceted functions to address the human rights situation in 
Peru, especially since Fujimori’s rise to power. In fact, the IACommHR has helped to 
monitor the human rights situation in Peru and to investigate human rights violations in 
the country.  Since Peru accepted the jurisdiction of the IACtHR on 21 January 1981, the 
Court has adjudicated in twenty-two cases where the international responsibility of Peru 
has been compromised. As a result of  Peru's conduct, the Court has also rendered 
advisory opinions to clarify certain human rights obligations of States in the Americas 
under the ACHR.28 The OAS has also been essential to the re-establishment of 
democracy in the country since the 1992 coup d’état.29 The following sections provide a 
brief but detailed account of the role played by the Commission and the Court. 
2.1 The IACommHR 
Before 1988, the Commission dealt with the human rights situation in Peru in an 
incidental manner, as illustrated by its annual report 1979-1980.30 This means, following 
Susana Villarán, that ‘…the Commission was not present during the years when the most 
egregious and massive human rights violations were committed.’31 Nevertheless, at the 
end of the 1980s the Commission began to receive many complaints against Peru related 
to gross human rights violations. As a result, between 1988 and 1991 the Commission 
adopted several reports on individual cases where it found that Peru had violated several 
rights of the ACHR in the fight against terrorism. In fact, the Commission adopted 
fourteen reports in 1988, two in 1989, and fifty-one between 1990 and 1991, all related to 
gross human rights violations.32 
This context prompted  the Commission to visit the country in May 1989 and in 
September and October 1991.  The Commission then published its first report on the 
human rights situation in Peru in 1993. Although the report does not acknowledge the 
existence of a general and systematic practice of gross human rights violations, it 
expresses serious concerns about the indiscriminate nature of violence and terror, 
affecting multiple rights of the ACHR.33 The Commission published its second report on 
the human rights situation in Peru in 2000, after its visit to the country in 1998.34 
Due to the seriousness of the human rights situation, the Commission also 
included chapters on Peru in several of its annual reports to the General Assembly 
 
26 La Cantuta, n. 3 above, paras. 135-145. 
27 The case of Castro Castro Prison is illustrative in this sense. Here, investigations were initiated in 2005, 13 
years after the events, n. 18 above, paras. 385-386. 
28 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion 14/1994, International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in 
Violation of the Convention, 9 Dec. 1994. 
29 IACommHR, First Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, 12 Mar. 1993, chap. III.b. In this report 
the Commission explains the reaction of the Permanent Council and the Ad-hoc Meeting of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs that was convened under Resolution 1080 of the General Assembly and the Santiago 
Commitment to Democracy in the region, as a result of the coup d’état in Peru.  
30 IACommHR, Annual Report 1979-1980, chap. IV. 
31 S. Villarán, ‘Peru’ in Due Process of Law Foundation (ed.), Victims Unsilenced, n. 2 above, 95-126 at 97. 
32 IACommHR, Annual Report 1993, chap. I.B. 
33 IACommHR, First Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, chap. I, para. 28. 
34 IACommHR, Second Report, n. 5 above. 
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between the years 1992 and 2001.35 All those reports contained important information in 
relation to the anti-terrorist measures adopted by Peru, and some illustrated human rights 
breaches with specific examples that later became cases before the IACtHR.  
 Despite the important information gathered by the Commission during more 
than a decade of work on Peru, it only addressed the systematic and general practice of 
gross human rights violations in reports on individual cases in the late 1990s.36 For 
instance, in its report 51/99, the Commission decided to join five cases related to 
disappearances in Peru, as it considered that they all followed the same pattern of 
violations. The Commission stated that 
…in the 1989-1993 period there existed in Peru a systematic and selective practice 
of forced disappearances, carried out by agents of, or at least tolerated by, the 
Peruvian State. That official practice of forced disappearances was part of the ‘fight 
against subversion’, although in many cases it harmed people who had nothing to 
do with the activities related to dissident groups.37 
Despite this late acknowledgment, the work of the IACommHR became essential to the 
documentation of human rights violations in Peru, and to an understanding of their 
modus operandi. These records would later facilitate the work of the Court in a variety of 
cases. 
2.2 The IACtHR 
The majority of cases decided by the IACtHR in the exercise of its contentious 
jurisdiction have been against Peru. Between the years 1995 and 2007 a total of twenty-
two cases have been decided, as illustrated in Appendix I. The majority of them, eleven 
in total, deal with disappearances, arbitrary killings, torture and massacres; six with 
arbitrary detention, unfair trial and inhuman treatment; and five with the unfair dismissal 
of justices of the Constitutional Court, the deprivation of nationality and freedom of 
expression and the right to property.  
Most of the cases share a common denominator: they concern the abuse of 
power exercised by Alan Garcia (the cases of Neira Alegria,38 Cayara,39 Durand and Ugarte 
and Cantoral Huamaní) or Fujimori, and their anti-terrorist policies. Also, they illustrate 
breaches of the rights of other persons not connected to terrorist activities but perceived 
by the Government as a threat.  Examples include the case of Yvcher Bronstein, whose 
nationality was withdrawn to stop him from releasing information about what was going 
on in the country to the public on his TV channel. It also includes the case of the 
Constitutional Court, which illustrated the lack of impartiality and independence of judges. 
When all twenty-two cases are considered together, an important progression can be 
                                                 
35 IACommHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1992-1993, chap. IV; Annual 
Report, 1993, chap. IV; Annual Report, 1996, chap. V; Annual Report, 1997, chap. V; Annual Report, 
1998, chap. II.2; and Annual Report, 2001, chap. V.   
36 Before this explicit acknowledgment of the situation in Peru, the IACommHR had referred in previous 
reports to ‘the context of violence that existed in Peru in 1990’, see for example Report 1/96, Chumbivilcas 
v. Peru, 1 Mar. 1996, para. 1, or to the practice of rape in emergency areas by military personnel, see for 
example Report 5/96, Raquel Mejía, 1 Mar. 1996, presumption of facts. 
37 IACommHR, Report 51/99, Anetro Castillo et al. v. Peru, 13 Apr. 1999, para. 75. This approach was 
reiterated in other cases such as Report 111/00, Pedro Pablo López et al. v. Peru, 4 Dec. 2000, para. 31.  
38 This case was later decided by the IACtHR, Neira Alegria et al. v. Peru, judgment on the merits, 19 Jan. 
1995. The Court found that there was a disproportionate use of force by the military forces in resisting the 
riot as a result of which the right to life of the three disappeared persons was violated. The Court also 
found violations of the right to habeas corpus and derogations under the ACHR. 
39 Due to procedural problems the case was declared inadmissible by the IACtHR. Nevertheless, the 
IACommHR published as a report the complaint it filed with Court, 12 Mar. 1993. Available at: 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Cayaraen/cayara.htm 
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detected in the way the Court deals with their facts. This progression has implications for 
the adequate reconstruction of events of historical memory (an important element of 
transitional justice) but, more to the point, for the fight against impunity in Peru.  
 The first judgments of the Court against Peru dealt mainly with the particular 
facts of each case and not so much with the wider context in which those facts were 
occurring. This is true of Neira Alegria or Loayza Tamayo.40 However, in Castillo Páez, the 
Court began to examine the context in which such violations were taking place and 
argued that such violations were part of a general practice.41 This was a response to the 
Commission’s claim that in 1990, when Castillo disappeared, there was in Peru a modus 
operandi by the security forces to disappear persons considered to be terrorists. The 
Court concluded  
…to have been proven that during the period in question, there existed in Peru a 
practice on the part of the forces of law and order which consisted in the forced 
disappearance of persons thought to be members of subversive groups, a practice 
well-publicized by the press.42  
Such recognition occurred before the establishment of the TRC. This indicates that, well 
before the establishment of the TRC, the Court was trying to define the nature of the 
practices carried out in Peru and the modus operandi of the Peruvian authorities.43 This 
work was carried out in relation to different practices, not only disappearances. For 
example, in the case of Cantoral Benavides, in relation to the arbitrary detention, unfair trial 
and inhuman treatment suffered by Luis Alberto, the Court considered proven that: 
‘during the time [he] was under arrest, physical and psychological aggression against 
people being investigated for the crimes of treason against the fatherland and terrorism 
was a common practice.’44 
However, it was not until the case of the brothers Gómez Paquiyauri,45 the first 
decided by the Court after the publication of the TRC report on 28 August 2003, that the 
Court made a strong argument linking the general practice of gross human rights 
violations with a military and police policy authorising such crimes.46 Indeed, in this case, 
which concerned the brothers’ arbitrary detention, inhuman treatment and arbitrary 
killing in June 1991, the Court began the section of proven facts with a subsection titled 
‘regarding the situation of the country’, where it stated the following: 
Between 1984 and 1993 there was a conflict in Peru between armed groups and 
agents of the police and military forces, in the midst of a systematic practice of 
human rights violations, including extra-legal executions, of persons suspected of 
belonging to armed groups. These practices were carried out by State agents 
following orders of military and police commanders.  
The state of emergency was declared several times during this period, including the 
Province of El Callao.  
 
40 See Appendix I for a brief description of the cases. 
41 IACtHR, Castillo Páez v. Peru, judgment on the merits, 3 Nov. 1997, para. 41. 
42 Ibid., para. 42. 
43 This approach  can also be seen in cases heard by the Court against other countries. This implies that, as 
the Court exercised its contentious jurisdiction more extensively, it also refined its approach to the facts of 
the cases, contributing, in this manner, to the reconstruction of historical memory in countries undergoing 
processes of transitional justice, as with Colombia or Guatemala. 
44 IACtHR, Cantoral Benavides, judgment on the merits, 18 Aug. 2000, para. 63.t. 
45 IACtHR, Gómez Paquiyauri, judgment on the merits and reparations, 8 July 2004. 
46 Interestingly, the Court did not mention the report of the TRC at all in the judgment. The only mention 
found of this report is in the concurring opinion of the ad hoc judge Francisco Eguiguren Praeli. 
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Specifically, a plan known as the ‘Cerco Noventiuno’, designed to capture and 
execute the principals of terrorist acts, was carried out in 1991.47  
The TRC report only made its way into the jurisprudence of the Court in the case of De 
la Cruz Flores,48 however it was only briefly mentioned. Yet in other cases the TRC report 
became an important tool with which to describe the modus operandi of the security 
forces in relation to particular violations such as enforced disappearances, as illustrated 
by the four paragraphs the Court dedicated to the topic in relation to the disappearance 
of Gómez Palomino.49 Equally, in the latter case and for the first time, the Court dedicated 
a section to the Colina group, a death squad established by the Security Forces and 
members of Government to eliminate their enemies, which was also responsible for the 
events in Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Huilca-Tecse, amongst other cases. The Court 
considered that 
The so-called ‘Colina Group’, composed of members of the Peruvian Army, was 
probably one of the best known units specialized in forced disappearances and 
arbitrary executions. This group was created as part of the strategies used to 
confront terrorism by the then recently established administration of President 
Fujimori…. This unit was in charge of operations specially designed to identify, 
control and eliminate members of subversive organizations or their followers 
and/or collaborators, by means of indiscriminate extrajudicial executions, 
collective assassinations, forced disappearances and torture.50  
After the judgment in Gómez Palomino, the Court lent even more importance to the TRC 
report in cases related to gross human rights violations against Peru. This can be seen in 
the cases of Baldeón García, Castro Castro Prison and La Cantuta, where the Court dedicated 
many paragraphs to the TRC and its findings in relation to the general pattern of gross 
human rights violations in Peru between the years 1989-1993, and the modus operandi of 
such practices.51 These judgments by the IACtHR, all relating to events that took place 
between 1990 and 1992, were decided by the Court when Fujimori was in Chile and his 
extradition was being negotiated. 
2.2.1 The Case of Barrios Altos 
The massacre occurred in the neighbourhood of Barrios Altos on 3 November 1991, in 
retaliation for a previous Shining Path action against military personnel. Members of the 
Colina Group arrived at a house party, forced people to lie down on the floor, and shot 
at them indiscriminately. Fifteen people were killed, including a child, and four more 
were injured. The Peruvian Congress initiated investigations but these stopped as 
Fujimori shut it down in April 1992. In 1995 investigations were initiated again. As 
already indicated,52 in response to the investigations and accusations President Fujimori 
and the Congress approved two Amnesty Laws, suspending any investigations and 
paving the path to impunity. A petition was originally filed before the Commission on 30 
June 1995 in relation to the events of Barrios Altos. In 1996 this was combined with other 
petitions relating to the same case. The Commission sent the case to the Court on 8 June 
2000, and the final decision was reached nine months later on 14 March 2001.  
  The case of Barrios Altos is a milestone for at least the three following reasons. 
Firstly,  it was the first case decided by the Court after the fall of Fujimori in November 
                                                 
47 Ibid., para. 67a-67c. 
48 IACtHR, De la Cruz Flores, judgment on the merits and reparations, 18 Nov. 2004, para. 61. 
49 IACtHR, Gómez Palomino, judgment on the merits and reparations, 22 Nov. 2005, para 54.1-54.4. 
50 Ibid., paras. 54.5-54.7. 
51 IACtHR, Baldeón Garcia, judgment on the merits and reparations, 6 April 2006, paras. 72.1-72.7; Castro 
Castro prison, n. 18 above, paras. 197.3-197.11; La Cantuta, n. 3 above, paras. 80.1-80.18. 
52 See, section 1.1 of this article on Amnesty Laws and Impunity. 
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2000, in relation to gross human rights violations that took place while he was in power. 
At that time of transition, Peru was eager to change its international reputation by 
improving its human rights record; therefore it acknowledged its international 
responsibility in the case.53 Such a positive step is always welcome, yet there was a danger 
that it might discourage the Court from commenting on the case, giving the false 
impression, as occurred with the cases against Guatemala, that things were improving, 
when in reality they were not.54 Nevertheless, in Barrios Altos things played out 
differently. The IACommHR welcomed the acknowledgment but requested of
…that ... by virtue of the State’s acquiescence, it should not only establish the 
specific violations of the articles of the Convention in which the State incurred ..., 
but also, in the operative paragraphs of the judgment, specifically establish the 
need to clarify the events, so as to protect the right to truth, the need to investigate 
and punish those responsible, ... the incompatibility of amnesty laws with the 
provisions of the American Convention, and ... the obligation of the State to annul 
amnesty laws.55 
While the Court accepted Peru’s recognition of international responsibility, it also 
dedicated a section of the decision to ‘the incompatibility of amnesty laws with the 
Convention’,56 where, for the very first time,57 it indicated that such laws and statutes of 
limitations are patently incompatible with the ACHR. The Court stated: 
This Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and 
the establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, 
because they are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those 
responsible for serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of them prohibited 
because they violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human rights 
law.58 
The Court went further, indicating that amnesty laws violate Article 8 (right to due 
process), Article 25 (right to judicial guarantees), Article 1 (obligation to respect rights 
under the Convention) and Article 2 (obligation to adapt domestic legislation) of the 
ACHR and therefore ‘lack legal effect’.59 In September 2003, in its interpretation of the 
judgment, the Court clarified that the legal consequences established in the Barrios Altos 
case refer not only to the facts of that particular case but are of general effect.60 
Therefore, the State is obligated to nullify the amnesty laws in relation to all cases, not 
only in relation to Barrios Altos.  
Secondly, this decision triggered investigations of gross human rights violations. 
It gave an authoritative order to Peru to investigate, prosecute, and punish the 
perpetrators of gross human rights violations in the country and to fulfil the right to 
 
53 IACtHR, Barrios Altos, n. 3 above, paras. 34-35. 
54 M. Mersky and N. Roht-Arriaza, ‘Guatemala’ in Due Process of Law Foundation (ed.), Victims Unsilenced, 
n. 2 above, 7-32, at 10-13. 
55 IACtHR, Barrios Altos, n. 3 above, para. 36. 
56 Ibid., section VII of the judgment. 
57 The IACommHR established that amnesty laws were incompatible with the ACHR since its Annual 
Report in 1985-1986. Nevertheless, it was in reports on individual cases where the Commission stated that 
such laws were contrary to the Convention. See, IACommHR, Report 26/92, Las Hojas Massacre v. El 
Salvador, 24 Sept. 1992; Report 28/92, Hugo Leonardo de los Santos et al. v. Uruguay, 2 Oct. 1992; Report 
28/92, Friendly Settlement Procedure in the case of Miguel Vaca et al. v. Argentina, 2 Oct. 1992. See also, S. Canton, 
‘Amnesty Laws’ in Due Process of Law Foundation (ed.). Victims Unsilenced, n. 2 above, 167-190.   
58 IACtHR, Barrios Altos, n. 3 above, para. 41. 
59 Ibid., para. 44.  
60 IACtHR, Barrios Altos, Interpretation of Judgment, 3 Sept. 2001, paras. 14-18. 
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truth of the victims’ next of kin. The impact of this decision was felt immediately in Peru 
and some years later in other countries of the Americas undergoing similar processes, 
such as Argentina and Colombia.61 In other words, the findings in this case have become 
valuable tools in the hands of state institutions and stakeholders arguing against 
impunity. 
The Peruvian Supreme Court decided that the decision by the IACtHR in the 
Barrios Altos case was binding on the judicial system, thus endorsing the fight against 
impunity. Further, the findings of the IACtHR were incorporated in the report of the 
TRC in various sections. For instance, when analysing the legal dimensions of the facts 
under investigation, the TRC noted that, according to the IACtHR, in the Barrios Altos 
case amnesty laws and statutes of limitations are not allowed as they are against the 
ACHR.,62 In addition, it has been indicated by people who worked at the TRC that the 
case of Barrios Altos gave the TRC the courage it needed to use its mandate to achieve 
justice.63 Indeed, what became clear for the TRC after the Barrios Altos case was that it 
should document cases so as to make such reconstruction available for those tasked with 
the pursuit of justice, such as the Prosecutors Office in Peru.  
The decision in Barrios Altos began to have an impact in important domestic 
judicial decisions taken by the highest courts, especially the Constitutional Court.64 This 
can be seen in the case of Genaro Villegas Namuche, where the Constitutional Court 
recognised that the right to know the truth has a societal dimension and an 
individual/next of kin dimension.65 That Constitutional Court also recognised the 
unconstitutionality of certain laws concerning the powers of the security forces during 
States of emergency, such as those related to the military jurisdiction and crimes related 
to the service.66 
  Furthermore, in the case of Santiago Martín Rivas (one of the army majors 
involved in the Barrios Altos massacre who petitioned against being brought to justice 
because a decision had been taken by a military tribunal in 1995 not to investigate the 
case further) the Constitutional Court used Barrios Altos to conclude that the res judicata 
and the non bis in idem cannot exonerate a person from criminal responsibility in two 
situations. Firstly, when it is patently clear that the objective of the criminal investigation 
(in this case the one conducted by the military justice) is not to investigate and punish the 
perpetrators and secondly, when the judicial body in charge of the investigation does not 
have the competence to investigate such crimes as they were not related to the service. 
                                                 
61 Supreme Court of Argentina, Judgment on the unconstitutionality of law 23.492 (Punto final) and law 23.521 
(Obediencia debida), 14 Jun. 2005. The case of Barrios Altos was one of the key authorities used in the 
judgment to declare the unconstitutionality of said laws. For a summary of the decision, see, CELS, ‘Las 
Leyes de Punto Final y Obediencia Debida Son Inconstitutionales’ 2006, available at:  
http://memoria.cels.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2006/06/sintesis_fallo_csjn_caso_poblete.pdf; and 
Constitutional Court of Colombia, judgment on the constitutionality of the Justice and Peace Law, C-
370/2006, 18 May 2006, para. 4.4.3. The Constitutional Court used Barrios Altos to consider the 
international obligations of Colombia and the constitutionality of the Justice and Peace Law. 
62 TRC, n. 4 above, vol 1, chap. IV, at 4.2.7. 
63 J. Ciurlizza and E. Gonzalez, ‘Verdad y Justicia desde la Óptica de la Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación’ in L. Magarrell and L. Filippini (eds.), El Legado de la Verdad: La Justicia en la Transición 
Peruana, (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2006) 85-104 at 96. 
64 According to Gloria Cano and Karim Ninaquispe more than 220 judgments were handed down by the 
Constitutional Court up until 2006 based on the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. See, G. Cano and K. 
Ninaquispe,  ‘El Papel de la Sociedad Civil en la Demanda y Promoción de Justicia’ in El Legado de la 
Verdad, n. 64 above, 61-84 at 72.  
65 Constitutional Court of Peru, Genaro Villegas Namuche, Exp 2488-2002, 18 Mar. 2004, paras. 8-20. 
66 Constitutional Court of Peru, Defensor del Pueblo and the Constitutionality of Law 24.150, Exp 0017-2003, 16 
Mar. 2004, paras. 110-134. 
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Therefore, the Constitutional Court decided against the petition, and allowed the 
prosecution of Rivas.67  
The Barrios Altos case has also been significant in the prosecution of Fujimori. 
Indeed, on 13 September 2001, six months after the decision, the Supreme Court 
Investigation Board started criminal investigations against Fujimori for the crimes 
committed in the cases of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta. The Supreme Prosecutor filed an 
accusation against Fujimori requesting thirty years imprisonment for his ‘joint 
perpetration of the crime of aggravated murder against the victims of Barrios Altos, and 
… joint perpetration of aggravated murder and forced disappearance of persons against 
the alleged victims of La Cantuta’.68 Equally the Prosecutor requested that Fujimori be 
declared unfit to hold public office and compelled to pay one hundred million Nuevos 
Soles as civil reparation for the victims of these crimes.69 
On 30 June 2004, the Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court decided to 
commence the trial of Fujimori in absentia as he was not in Peru. The Chamber also 
requested the extradition of Fujimori to a transitory Chamber of the Supreme Court, 
which granted the request for Fujimori’s involvement in twelve cases in December 
2005.70 On 3 January 2006, the President of Peru formally requested the extradition of 
Fujimori from Chile, based on a variety of national laws and the 1932 extradition treaty 
between the two countries. 
Barrios Altos has become a foundational case under international and regional law, 
establishing the practice of questioning amnesty laws and statutes of limitations in 
situations where gross human rights violations such as arbitrary killing, disappearances 
and torture are at stake. It was a judgment needed in the Americas region, where 
amnesties had been the rule in almost all countries undergoing transitions, from 
Argentina to El Salvador. Not only did the case establish limitations to what can be done 
after periods of conflict or in emergencies, it also effected immediate changes on the 
ground, which empowered stakeholders to fight for justice. Most institutions in Peru 
responded in a positive manner to the decision, but justice was far from being achieved. 
Indeed, Fujimori was now in Chile evading justice, and the victims of authoritarianism 
had to confront a new fight: his extradition to Peru. It was in the middle of this new 
battle that the IACtHR seized another important political moment with its decision in La 
Cantuta. 
2.2.2 The Case of La Cantuta 
In the evening of 18 July 1992, the Colina group and members of the Peruvian military 
arrived at the campus of Enrique Guzmán y Valle University, believed to be under the 
control of the Shining Path. They went first to students’ dormitories, where they forced 
students to lie down and, matching people to names on a list, took away nine students. 
Then they went to the professors’ houses and dragged one of them away. The 
whereabouts of those taken was unknown until July and November 1993, when some of 
the mortal remains of two of them were found in clandestine graves. The whereabouts of 
the other persons is still unknown. 
Although a petition in this case arrived at the Commission in 30 July 1992, the 
case was only declared admissible on 11 March 1999. On 24 October 2005 the 
Commission adopted a report in line with Article 50 of the ACHR, in which it 
considered that Peru had violated several rights of the ACHR. This report was sent to 
 
67 Constitutional Court of Peru, Santiago Martín Rivas, Exp 4587-2004, 29 Nov. 2005.  
68 IACtHR, La Cantuta, n. 3 above, para. 80.86. 
69 Ibid. 
70 The other cases referred to the kidnapping and inhuman treatment of several persons in the 
underground level of the Intelligence Services Offices, and to different charges related to corruption. 
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Peru with recommendations. Although Peru replied to the report, the Commission sent 
the case to the Court as it believed that Peru had not implemented its recommendations 
satisfactorily.71 The case was filed at the Court on 14 February 2006, almost fourteen 
years after it was presented before the Commission. How is such a delay to be explained? 
Why was it sent to the Court in 2006? Among the possible reasons one is particularly 
important. At the time the case was sent to the Court, the government of Peru was 
seeking the extradition of Fujimori, who had been in Chile since 6 November 2005, to 
Peru. Further, La Cantuta concerned disappearances and arbitrary killings committed 
during a period in which it was acknowledged that the state engaged in a systematic 
practice of such violations to fight subversive groups. Therefore, in my view, it was a 
case that could potentially play an important legal and political function: to assist the 
extradition of Fujimori to Peru. 
 Peru acknowledged its partial international responsibility in relation to the case.72 
It accepted the facts of the case, including the existence of the Colina group and that it 
carried out the abductions and disappearances of the nine students and the professor. 
However, Peru said that it could only acknowledge responsibility for lack of investigation 
and prosecution during Fujimori’s government, but not after he left power, as since then 
the State had done all it could to achieve justice in the particular case. Peru also rejected 
the claim for reparations made by the Commission and the representatives of the victims. 
The Court accepted the recognition of responsibility but due to the serious nature of the 
violations held that: 
Taking into account the powers vested in the Court for the best protection of 
human rights, and bearing in mind the context in which the events of the instant 
case have taken place, the Court considers that a judgment adjudicating on the 
issues of fact and on all the elements of the merits of the case, as well as on the 
corresponding consequences thereof, constitutes a way of contributing to the 
preservation of the historical memory, to the redress of the damage inflicted upon 
the next of kin of the victims and, moreover, it also contributes to avoid the 
repetition of similar events.73 
Subsequently, the Court produced a symbolic judgment despite the partial 
acknowledgement of responsibility of Peru, in which it also decided on the matters still 
under dispute. In relation to the latter, that is the ongoing violation of Articles 8 (right to 
due process) and 25 (right to judicial guarantees) of the ACHR, the Court considered that 
although the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of such 
crimes is not an obligation of result but of conduct, Peru was still in breach of those 
obligations as the measures taken domestically were not effective enough to achieve 
justice. So, for example, the Court pointed out that although criminal proceedings were 
initiated after the fall of Fujimori, nothing had been done to locate the eight persons who 
remained disappeared.74 The Court equally stated that no new proceedings had been 
initiated in Peru against persons convicted for these crimes by military tribunals, and that 
none of the convicted persons were currently in prison serving sentences.75  
 However, what was really groundbreaking in the decision was the indication that 
under international law states have an international obligation to cooperate in bringing to 
justice those responsible for gross human rights violations. Here, the Court was 
addressing Chile and reminding it that:  
                                                 
71 IACtHR, La Cantuta,  n. 3 above, paras. 5-14. 
72 Ibid., paras. 37-44. 
73 Ibid., para. 57. 
74 Ibid., para. 146. 
75 Ibid., para. 150. 
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…the acts involved in the instant case have violated peremptory norms of 
international law (jus cogens). Under Article 1(1) of the American Convention, the 
States have the duty to investigate human rights violations and to prosecute and 
punish those responsible. In view of the nature and seriousness of the events, all 
the more since the context of this case is one of systematic violation of human 
rights, the need to eradicate impunity reveals itself to the international community 
as a duty of cooperation among states for such purpose. Access to justice 
constitutes a peremptory norm of International Law and, as such, it gives rise to 
the States’ erga omnes obligation to adopt all such measures as are necessary to 
prevent such violations from going unpunished, whether exercising their judicial 
power to apply their domestic law and International Law to judge and eventually 
punish those responsible for such events, or collaborating with other States aiming 
in that direction. The Court points out that, under the collective guarantee 
mechanism set out in the American Convention, and the regional and universal 
international obligations in this regard, the States Parties to the Convention must 
collaborate with one another towards that end.76 
So, with a very diplomatic statement, the Court reminded Chile that it had the obligation 
to consider the extradition of Fujimori to Peru for cases like La Cantuta, so that the fight 
against impunity could take place. 
2.3  The Extradition from Chile 
In response to a request by Peruvian authorities, Chilean authorities detained Fujimori on 
6 November 2005 when he arrived in Chile. Although he had been banned from public 
office, Fujimori intended to make his way to Peru to run for the 2006 presidential 
elections. The judge in charge of his case in Chile, Orlando Alvarez, rejected his 
extradition on 11 July 2007. On appeal, on 21 September 2007, the Second Criminal 
Chamber of the Supreme Court in Chile decided to grant the extradition in relation to 
some of the grounds presented by Peru. 
2.3.1 The Decision of Judge Orlando Alvarez 
Peru requested the extradition of Fujimori based on twelve cases against him, the 
majority of which were for corruption-related crimes and three for gross human rights 
violations: La Cantuta, Barrios Altos, and the kidnapping and torture of Samuel Dyer, 
Gustavo Gorriti, and others.77 The judge rejected the extradition in relation to the twelve 
cases. The judge considered that there were only indicia, but not enough evidence to 
consider that Fujimori knew of and had authorised the crimes in La Cantuta, Barrios Altos 
and the kidnappings.78 He maintained that the President knew nothing about the events 
of Barrios Altos, as the Colina group was an element of the military forces that predated 
Fujimori, and that the massacre was a response to an attack on the military forces that 
took place before Fujimori arrived in power.79 He argued that the cases are built on ‘mere 
presumptions that while he was President of the Republic, for having such a job, he had 
to have ordered the killings or consented to them’.80 Further, the Judge stated that the 
decisions by the IACtHR in La Cantuta and Barrios Altos were decisions against Peru and 
not against Fujimori, and that such decisions did not expressly mention Fujimori at any 
time, but only the institution of the Presidency of Peru or the Government.81 
 
76 Ibid., para. 160. 
77 Supreme Court of Justice, Chile, Recurso 5646-2005, 11 July 2007, Judge Orlando Alvarez. 
78 Ibid., para. 112. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., para. 115. 
81 Ibid. 
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The Judge concluded that regarding extradition requests it was his duty not only 
to look at the formal elements of the request, such as the double criminality principle, but 
also to arrive at the conviction that the person to be extradited had committed the 
imputed crimes.82 This decision was severely criticised by lawyers, academics and human 
rights defenders.83 
2.3.2 The Decision of the Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice 
The decision taken by Judge Alvarez was appealed before the Second Criminal Chamber 
of the Supreme Court, which granted the extradition request in relation to seven of the 
twelve cases, including La Cantuta, Barrios Altos and the kidnapping of Gustavo Gorriti 
and Samuel Dyer. In relation to the cases of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, the Court 
maintained that there was sufficient evidence to consider Fujimori as a co-author of 
those crimes. The Court considered that important evidence incriminated Fujimori, 
including multiple witness statements from people who were present when Fujimori and 
Montesinos planned the acts or where the former authorised the latter. Other evidence 
illustrated that Fujimori gave military decorations to members of the Colina Group after 
such crimes. But, more importantly, there was evidence that, since the coup d’état, 
Fujimori had been in control of all branches of power, and had devised his own 
intelligence strategy to fight terrorism in the country.84  
The judgment of the IACtHR in the case of Barrios Altos was presented as 
evidence before the Supreme Court.85 Nevertheless, the Court did not explicitly rely on 
this judgment to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to incriminate Fujimori to 
the crimes86 as it only relied on direct evidence incriminating Fujimori. Despite the lack 
of acknowledgment of the decision to grant the extradition on the grounds alleged by 
Peru, it is indisputable that both Barrios Altos and La Cantuta influenced the decision of 
the Supreme Court. In such situations, judgments are determined not only by the 
materials at hand, but also by other less visible constraints. In this case, the two decisions 
by the IACtHR were among those constraints, especially taking into account that the 
IACtHR had decided the case of Almonacid Arellano against Chile in September 2006, in 
which it condemned its amnesty law, requested Chile to declare it void, and required 
Chile to investigate, prosecute and punish gross human rights violations.87 Therefore, 
Chile could not appear before the international community as a state that continues to 
tolerate impunity. 
The decision by the Supreme Court of Chile approving the extradition of 
Fujimori is an unprecedented decision, as Fujimori is the first former head of state to be 
extradited to his home country to face trial for gross human rights violations.88 He was 
extradited to Peru on 22 September 2007. As a result of the extradition decision, on 29 
October 2007 the Prosecutor in charge of the case in Peru, José Peláez, requested thirty 
years imprisonment for the homicides in the cases of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, for 
serious bodily injuries to the surviving victims in Barrios Altos, and for the kidnapping of 
Gustavo Gorriti and Samuel Dyer. The prosecutor also requested the payment of 
compensation of 100,000 Nuevos Soles to the victims in Barrios Altos and La Cantuta and 
                                                 
82 Ibid., 122. 
83 Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, ‘Caso Fujimori: Análisis Jurídico de la Sentencia del Ministro 
Orlando Álvarez’, 5 Sept. 2007, available at: http://www.juicioysancionafujimori.org/ documentos.htm 
84 Supreme Court of Justice, Second Criminal Chamber, Chile, 3744-2007, 21 Sept. 2007, paras. 92-95. 
85 Ibid., para. 92, evidence 23. 
86 Ibid., para. 95. 
87 IACtHR, Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, judgment on the merits and reparations, 26 Sept. 2006, paras. 105-
122. 
88 Luis García Mesa, dictator in Bolivia in 1980, was extradited to his country from Brazil after the trial had 
taken place in absentia. He went back to Bolivia to serve his sentence in 1995. 
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300,000 to Gorriti and Dyer. The trial of Fujimori began on 10 December 2007. Fujimori 
is being tried by the Specialised Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice 
according to the mandate of Article 100 of the 1993 Peruvian constitution.89 More than 
sixty hearings have taken place in the trial so far, and it is unknown how long the trial will 
last. Fujimori’s criminal responsibility seems to be compromised in several cases related 
to gross human rights violations, however he can only be prosecuted in Peru for the 
crimes for which he was extradited. This means that he will never be investigated for 
other cases. In this sense, extradition can also become a mechanism to help impunity. 
Nevertheless, his criminal responsibility in Barrios Altos and La Cantuta is being judged 
and this should be seen as a positive step in the fight against impunity, mainly if it is 
taken into account that, very rarely, a former head of state is brought to justice to face 
trial for such crimes. 
2.4 Other Trials in Peru 
As a result of the lack of legal effect of the amnesty laws, several processes have been 
reopened in Peru against persons suspected of committing gross human rights violations. 
The processes are against the perpetrators of crimes (such as the members of the Colina 
Group) as well as against criminal masterminds (Montesinos, Hermosa Ríos). In these 
cases the judgments in Barrios Altos and La Cantuta have been essential tools for the 
reconstruction of important facts that will be significant in the trial against Fujimori. A 
good example of this is the recent decision by the First Special Criminal Chamber of the 
Superior Court of Justice of Lima against Julio Rolando Salazar Monroe and others 
related to La Cantuta.90 
The Court was authorised to decide whether Salazar Monroe, the Director of the 
SIN at the time of the events, and four other people, members of the military and the 
Colina group, were guilty of homicide, bodily injury and kidnapping. In the case of 
Salazar Monroe, the Court had to prove that he knew of the plan to detain and disappear 
the ten people from La Cantuta university, and that he was one of the people with 
authority over the Colina Group. Based on confessions, statements, and also on the 
decision by the IACtHR in the case of La Cantuta, the Court concluded that they were all 
guilty. 
The Court in Lima referred to paragraphs 80.18 to 82 of the La Cantuta 
judgment, as in those paragraphs the IACtHR acknowledged that there was a systematic 
practice of arbitrary killings and disappearances in Peru, and that the Colina group was 
established by the military and the government to carry out the dirty war against 
terrorism. These two statements assisted the Court to establish the theory that there was 
an organised and hierarchical criminal structure running intelligence operations, and that 
the Colina group and people like Salazar Monroe and the other defendants were part of 
such machinery.91  
This decision is bound to be important in the Fujimori trial, as one of the 
defence’s arguments is that Fujimori did not control or order military operations, and 
that therefore he is not guilty of the tragic events. As for the Colina group, Fujimori has 
either denied the existence of the group or has said that he only learnt of its existence 
 
89 Prosecutor General, Indictment 2275-2007-1aFSP-MPFN, available at: 
http://www.pj.gob.pe/CorteSuprema/spe/index.asp?codigo=5578&opcion=detalle_cuerpo 
90 Superior Court of Justice of Lima, First Special Criminal Chamber, Expediente: 03-2003-1SPE/CSJLI, 8 
Apr. 2008. 
91 Ibid., paras. 50, 51,136, 137 
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from Montesinos in 1993.92 Therefore, this case against Salazar Monroe and others 
constitutes further evidence to rebut the arguments of Fujimori’s defence.  
 
Conclusion 
The fight against impunity in Peru is paradigmatic of what can be achieved if political 
opportunities are seized by the protagonists and participants of processes of transitional 
justice. In this article I have illustrated the significance that the IACtHR, sitting in Costa 
Rica, can have in domestic and international politics at such moments. By concentrating 
on two decisions by the Court, those of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, I have illustrated the 
legal and political significance of the Court and of those judgments for Peru and Chile. 
The decision of Barrios Altos has been fundamental to the fight against impunity 
in Peru and in other countries in the Americas region. The IACtHR took this decision 
during the first months of transition in Peru, when the need for change was widely 
recognised by Peruvian society and when the foundations of the transition were being 
established. It was in this context that the investigations that had been halted as a 
consequence of the amnesty laws were re-opened and new ones were set in motion. This 
decision even affected the mandate of the TRC, as it inspired its members to gather 
detailed information to help the Prosecutors Office in the fight against impunity. Indeed, 
the TRC took this obligation seriously and documented seventy-three cases, which were 
reported to the Prosecutors Office in order to enable it to begin, ex officio, a criminal 
investigation of the possible perpetrators.93  
The judgment in La Cantuta complements the case of Barrios Altos as it extends 
the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish gross human rights violations to states 
other than Peru by arguing that there is an international obligation to cooperate in such 
processes. This decision occured at another key political moment that was rightly seized 
by the IACtHR: when Peru demanded the extradition of Fujimori from Chile. Certainly, 
the work of the Court in these cases cannot be attributed entirely to its activism, as the 
IACommHR was also instrumental in getting those cases to the Court and nothing 
would have happened in Peru if it had not been for stakeholders using such judgments to 
fight impunity.   
Both Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, as well as other cases decided by the Court 
between 1995 and 2007, have been essential to the argument that gross human rights 
violations took place in Peru between 1989 and 1993 in a systematic manner, to 
corroborate the existence of death squads like the Colina group, and to illustrate the 
existence of a state policy ‘created, organized and directed from the heart of the 
Presidency of the Republic and the Army Command’.94 Therefore, these cases have been 
relevant not only in empowering people to fight against impunity but also in providing 
legal operators with important evidence and legal arguments, which are of utmost 
importance in the trial against Fujimori, as was noted in the case of Salazar Monroe and 
others. 
Finally, and although there are many examples attesting to the limitations of law 
to affect the course of politics, the case of Peru suggests the opposite: law’s capacity to 
establish the limits and possibilities of politics, if it is properly articulated by stakeholders 
at key political moments. Indeed, the cases of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta have been 
significant from a legal and political point of view: both have contributed to the precision 
                                                 
92 J. Burt, ‘The Trial of Alberto Fujimori’, special report for the Washington Office on Latin America of 
the first week of the trial of Fujimori, 31 Dec. 2007, available at: 
http://www.wola.org/index.php?Itemid=2&id=624&option=com_content&task=viewp 
93 TRC, n. 4 above, vol. VII, chap. II, p.1-3. 
94 As argued by the IACommHR. IACtHR, Gómez Palomino, n. 50 above, para. 54.6. 
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of states’ international obligations in the fight against impunity, and both have seized 
political opportunities to allow victims and those interested to challenge impunity. 
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Appendix I 
 
Cases against Peru decided by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
(total of cases up to 5 May 2008: 23) 
Case Date of the 
events/violations 
Date petition  
was filed with 
the 
IACommHR 
Date 
IACommHR 
took the case 
to the IACtHR 
Date the case 
was decided by 
the IACtHR on 
the merits 
Neira Alegria 
et al. 
18 June 1986: Riot at El 
Fronton Prison where 
more than 100 detainees 
were killed or 
disappeared. 
31 August 1997 10 October 1990 19 January 
1995 
Cayara 14 May 1988: Around 40 
persons were killed or 
disappeared in the Cayara 
province by military 
personnel.  
17 November 
1988 
14 February 
1992 
3 February 
1993 (no 
decision on the 
merits as it was 
declared 
inadmissible by 
the Court). 
Loayza 
Tamayo  
6 February 1993 onwards: 
Maria Helena Loayza was 
arbitrarily detained, 
subjected to inhuman 
treatment and to unfair 
trial for the crimes of 
treason against the 
fatherland and terrorism. 
6 May 1993 12 January 1995 17 September 
1997 
Castillo Páez 21 October 1990: The 
abduction and 
disappearance of Rafael 
Castillo Páez by the 
National Police. 
16 November 
1990 
13 January 1995 3 November 
1997 
Castillo 
Petruzzi et al. 
14 and 15 October 1993: 
4 Chilean nationals were 
detained in Peru, 
prosecuted and sentenced 
to life imprisonment for 
the crime of treason 
against the fatherland. 
Several human rights 
violations took place 
during the detention and 
trial. 
28 January 1994 22 July 1997 20 May 1999 
Cesti Hurtado 25 November 1996: 
The trial by a Military 
court of a citizen of Peru 
who had retired from the 
army in 1984 for the 
crimes of fraud and 
disobedience against the 
duty and dignity of the 
service. 
 
7 March 1997 9 January 1998 29 September 
1999 
Durand and 
Ugarte 
18 June 1986: 
See the case of Neira 
Alegria above. 
 
 
 
 
27 April 1987 8 August 1996 16 August 2000
 
                                              The Challenge of Impunity in Peru                                             19 
 
Cantoral 
Benavides 
6 February 1993: The 
arbitrary detention, unfair 
trial and inhuman 
treatment of Luis Alberto 
Cantoral Benavides 
18 April 1994 8 August 1996 18 August 2000
Constitutional 
Court 
29 August 1996 onwards: 
The dismissal of justices 
of the Constitutional 
Court for deciding against 
the interests of President 
Fujimori and the 
constitutional article in 
relation to his re-election. 
2 June 1997 2 July 1999 31 January 
2001 
Yvcher 
Bronstein 
The deprivation of 
Peruvian nationality of 
Yvcher Bronstein, 
majority shareholder of 
Channel 2 of Peruvian 
television, to stop him 
continuing to denounce 
human rights violations 
and acts of corruption. 
9 June 1997 31 March 1999 6 February 
2001 
Barrios Altos 3 November 1991: 
Massacre that killed 15 
persons and injured 4 
more was perpetrated by 
members of the Colina 
group in the 
neighbourhood of the 
same name 
30 June 1995 
(other petitions 
followed by 
other NGOs and 
next of kin of the 
victims in 1996) 
8 June 2000 14 March 2001 
Five 
Pensioners 
April 1992: Unjustified 
and illegal changes in the 
pension rights of 5 retired 
persons. 
1 Ferbruary 1998 4 December 
2001 
28 February 
2003 
Gómez 
Paquiyauri 
brothers 
21 June 1991: The 
arbitrary detention, 
torture and arbitrary 
killing of Emilio and 
Rafael Gómez-Paquiyauri.
2 July 1991 5 February 2002 8 July 2004 
De la Cruz 
Flores 
27 March 1996 onwards: 
María Teresa was 
arbitrarily detained, 
subjected to inhuman 
treatment and to an unfair 
trial for the crime of 
terrorism. 
1 September 
1998 
11 June 2003 18 November 
2004 
Lori 
Berenson-
Mejía 
30 November 1995 
onwards: Lori Berenson 
was detained, subjected to 
inhuman treatment and to 
an unfair trial and 
sentenced to life 
imprisonment for the 
crime of treason. 
22 January 1998 19 July 2002 25 November 
2004 
Huilca-Tecse 18 December 1992: The 
arbitrary killing of Pedro 
Huilca, trade union leader, 
by the members of the 
Colina group.  
 
4 June 1997 12 March 2004 3 March 2005 
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Gómez 
Palomino 
9 July 1992: The 
abduction and subsequent 
disappearance of Santiago 
Gómez Palomino. 
8 October 1992 13 September 
2004 
22 November 
2005 
Acevedo 
Jaramillo et 
al. 
The non-compliance with 
some domestic judgments 
ordering the reinstatement 
of some workers to their 
jobs between 1996 and 
2000. 
13 June 1999 25 June 2003 7 February 
2006 
Baldeón 
García 
25 September 1990 
onwards: The abduction, 
inhuman treatment and 
subsequent dead of 
Bernabé Baldeón while in 
military custody 
24 May 1997 11 February 
2005 
6 April 2006 
Dismissed 
Congressional 
Employees 
31 December 1992: 
Unfair dismissal of 257 
employees from the 
National Congress.  
18 October 1997 
and 10 July 1998 
4 February 2005 24 November 
2006 
Castro Castro 
Prison 
6 May 1992 onwards: The 
killing and inhuman 
treatment of 
approximately 500 
inmates of the Castro 
Castro Prison as a 
consequence of Operative 
Transfer I authorized by 
President Fujimori 
18 May 1992 and 
5 June 1997 
9 September 
2004 
25 November 
2006 
La Cantuta 18 July 1992: The 
disappearance of one 
professor and 9 students 
from La Cantuta by the 
Colina Group 
30 July 1992 14 February 
2006 
29 November 
2006 
Cantoral 
Huamaní and 
García Santa 
Cruz 
13 February 1989: The 
abduction, torture and 
extrajudicial killing of Saúl 
Cantoral and Consuelo 
García by the Rodrigo 
Franco Comando 
9 May 1989 21 February 
2006 
10 July 2007 
 
